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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
 
Section 2B3.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines establishes 
offense levels for those federal crimes which constitute 
types of "robbery." The base offense level is 20. U.S.S.G. 
S 2B3.1. Enhancement of the base offense level is mandated 
whenever the generic crime of robbery has especially 
hurtful consequences (e.g., serious bodily injury or the loss 
of property of great value) or is carried out in conjunction 
with any of the other forms of disapproved conduct that the 
Sentencing Commission has particularized under the 
heading "Specific Offense Characteristics." Thus, sub- 
section (b)(2) of S 2B3.1 calls for offense-level enhancements 
of the base offense level ranging from two levels, "if a threat 
of death was made," U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1(b)(2)(F), to seven 
levels, "[i]f a firearm was discharged." U.S.S.G. 
S 2B3.1(b)(2)(A). A five-level enhancement is called for "if a 
firearm was brandished, displayed, or possessed." U.S.S.G. 
S 2B3.1(b)(2)(C). It is the proper construction of this latter 
provision that is placed in issue in this appeal. 
 
The precise question presented by this appeal is whether 
a firearm concealed on the person of one who is committing 
a bank robbery is "a firearm" which, within the meaning of 
U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1(b)(2)(C), "was possessed" (emphasis 
added). In calculating appellant's sentence, the district 
court found that the firearm was "possessed," and 
accordingly added five levels to the base offense level. We 
agree with the district court's reading of the guideline, and 
we therefore affirm. 
 




Between May and August of 1996, four Pittsburgh banks 
were robbed, and bank surveillance photographs taken at 
the time of the robberies suggested that one person had 
committed all four robberies. On October 4, 1996, FBI 
agents were assigned to patrol downtown Pittsburgh with a 
view to finding the robber. One of the agents spotted a man 
-- Leslie Thomas Weadon -- who looked like the 
surveillance photographs, and he was arrested. When 
arrested, Weadon had a gun in the waistband of his 
trousers. Subsequent to his arrest Weadon acknowledged 
that he had committed the four bank robberies and that he 
had carried a gun in his pocket on three of the four 
occasions. On October 8, 1996, Weadon was indicted on 
four counts of bank robbery in contravention of 18 U.S.C. 
S 2113(a). 
 
On November 29, 1996, Weadon pleaded guilty to the 
four-count indictment. Hearings on sentence were held on 
April 17 and April 24, 1997, and sentence was imposed on 
the latter date. Over defense counsel's objection that 
Weadon's concealed weapon played no part in any of the 
three bank robberies in which he had it in his pocket, the 
district court added five points to the base offense level on 
the ground that Weadon's having the firearm on his person 
during the robberies meant that he "possessed" the firearm 
within the meaning of U.S.S.G. S 23B.1(b)(2)(C) (five level 
enhancement "if a firearm was brandished, displayed, or 
possessed"). The five-level enhancement resulted in an 
offense level of 28 and (since Weadon had no prior criminal 
record and hence was in criminal history category I) a 
guideline incarceration range of 78-97 months.1 The district 
court imposed a prison term of 78 months. (But for the 
five-level enhancement, the guideline range would have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Weadon's base offense level was 20 under U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1. Because 
the victim was a financial institution, two points were added to his 
offense level pursuant to S 2B3.1(b)(1). Four points were then added to 
his offense level based on the multiple counts of robbery. See S 3D1.4. 
Weadon's offense level was also raised by five points under 
S 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) because he possessed a firearm during three of the four 
robberies. Finally, Weadon received a three point reduction of his offense 
level for acceptance of responsibility under S 3E1.1. 
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been 46 to 57 months). In appealing his sentence, Weadon 
challenges the district court's reading of U.S.S.G. 
S 23B.1(b)(2)(C) as mandating a five-level enhancement. Our 
review of a district court's interpretation of the sentencing 
guidelines is de novo. United States v. Dixon, 982 F.2d 116 




As explained above, at Weadon's sentencing his base 
offense level was enhanced by five levels pursuant to the 
directive of U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1(b)(2)(c) that "if," in the course 
of a robbery, "a firearm was brandished, displayed, or 
possessed, increase by five levels." As noted, the predicate 
for the enhancement was the fact that Weadon had a gun 
in his pocket during three of the four robberies to which he 
pleaded guilty. 
 
On appeal Weadon contends that carrying a gun in one's 
pocket is not possession of that gun within the intendment 
of the quoted guideline. Weadon argues "that `possessed' 
should be construed similarly to `brandished' or `displayed,' 
and that the guideline should not be applied to enhance a 
sentence where the firearm was not utilized during the 
robbery." In support of these linked contentions Weadon 
makes two linked arguments. The argument that the 
guideline is without application unless the firearm has been 
"utilized during the robbery" draws upon the fact that 
Application Note 4 of the Sentencing Commission's 
Commentary on S 2B3.1 specifies that "[t]he combined 
adjustments for weapon involvement and injury are limited 
to a maximum enhancement of 11 levels;" the 
Commentary's use of the phrase "weapon involvement" is 
said by Weadon to evidence "a clear intention that for the 
enhancement to apply, the firearm must be actively used or 
employed to further the goals of the robbery." The argument 
that " `possessed' should be construed similarly to 
`brandished' or `displayed' " is based upon the ejusdem 
generis principle that, as Black's Law Dictionary puts the 
matter, "where general words follow the enumeration of 
particular classes of things, the general words will be 
construed as applying only to things of the same general 
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class as those enumerated." Black's Law Dictionary 517 
(6th ed. 1990). 
 
We find neither argument persuasive: 
 
(1) Weapon Involvement 
 
Based on Application Note 4's reference to "weapon 
involvement," Weadon reasons that "for the enhancement to 
apply, the firearm must be actively used or employed to 
further the goals of the robbery." Since, during the three 
bank robberies in question, Weadon's gun was lodged in his 
pocket and no one other than Weadon was aware of its 
presence, Weadon contends that the sense in which he 
could be said to have possessed the gun lacked any 
ingredient of "involvement" in the robberies and hence 
cannot properly warrant enhancement of his sentence. The 
implicit predicate of this contention is that a concealed 
weapon whose existence is unknown to the victim is 
necessarily irrelevant to the crime. We reject that predicate. 
And, what is more important, it is evident to us that the 
Sentencing Commission, as author of S 2B3.1(b)(2)(C), also 
rejects it. Evidence to this effect can be found if one traces 
S 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) back to its source. 
 
In September of 1986 the Sentencing Commission 
published a "preliminary draft" of the guidelines scheduled 
to go into force the following year. Four months later -- in 
January of 1987 -- the Sentencing Commission, having 
reviewed the extensive public comment on the preliminary 
draft, published a "revised draft." Section B231 of the 
revised draft -- "Robbery and Attempted Robbery" -- was 
the final draft formulation of the robbery guideline and 
hence was the immediate progenitor of S 2B3.1 as formally 
promulgated by the Sentencing Commission to take effect 
in the fall of 1987. The four specific offense characteristics 
dealt with in revised draft S B231 were: (1) weapons, (2) 
whether the crime "involved a financial institution or a 
federal facility," (3) whether "the object of the robbery or 
attempted robbery was a controlled substance and the 
offense occurred in a pharmacy or other location where 
controlled substances were legitimately manufactured or 
stored," and (4) "the value of the property taken." Among 
the specific offense characteristics not dealt with in revised 
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draft S B231, but which were to appear several months 
later in S 2B3.1, the most salient were: (1) whether "any 
victim sustained bodily injury," and (2) the abduction or 
physical restraint of "any person" in order "to facilitate 
commission of the offense or to facilitate escape."2 
 
Of particular pertinence to our present inquiry are (1) the 
first of the specific offense characteristics proposed in 
revised draft S B231, and (2) a portion of the Sentencing 
Commission's Commentary. The first of the specific offense 
characteristics in the revised draft was S B231(a)(1): 
 
       If a weapon or dangerous instrumentality was used, 
       displayed, or possessed in the commission of the 
       offense, increase by 3 to 6 levels, depending upon the 
       use made of the weapon. 
 
In its Commentary to revised draft S B231 the Sentencing 
Commission said: "The use of a firearm or dangerous 
weapon constitutes the most serious aggravating 
characteristic of a robbery. Since possession of a weapon 
during a robbery adds significantly to the potential danger 
of injury, the guidelines provide an enhancement where a 
weapon was present." 
 
The transition from revised draft guideline S B231 to 
guideline S 2B3.1 as it went into effect in the fall of 1987 
worked a change in the structure of the specific offense 
characteristic governing weapons. U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1(b)(2) 
provided as follows: 
 
       (A) If a firearm was discharged increase by 5 levels; 
       (B) if a firearm or a dangerous weapon was otherwise 
       used, increase by 4 levels; (C) if a firearm or other 
       dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed or 
       possessed, increase by 3 levels. 
 
By way of "Background" the Sentencing Commission's 
Commentary on S 2B3.1 commenced its discussion with the 
following recital: "Possession or use of a weapon, physical 
injury, and unlawful restraint sometimes occur during a 
robbery. The guideline provides for a range of enhancement 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Subsequent amendments of S 2B3.1 have added other specific offense 
characteristics and broadened existing categories. 
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when these factors are present." This "Background" recital 
has remained constant throughout the various 
amendments of S 2B3.1. It seems a fair inference that 
underlying the Sentencing Commission's continuing 
adherence to the principle of sentence enhancement for 
"possession" as well as "use" of a weapon is the Sentencing 
Commission's January 1987 observation that "possession 
of a weapon during a robbery adds significantly to the 
potential danger of injury." Accordingly, the concealed gun 
of a bank robber may properly be regarded as coming 
under the heading of "weapon involvement." 3 
 
(2) Whether " `possessed' should be construed 
similarly to `brandished' or `displayed' " 
 
As noted above, Weadon's argument that " `possessed' 
should be construed similarly to `brandished' or 
`displayed' " invokes the principle of ejusdem generis. The 
standard treatise on statutory interpretation states the 
principle of ejusdem generis as follows:"Where general 
words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the 
general words are construed to embrace only objects 
similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the 
preceding specific words." 2A Sutherland Statutory 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The proposition that the dangers attendant on criminal conduct are 
compounded when the offender has a weapon on his person is hardly 
novel. Consider 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1), providing that "[w]hoever, during 
and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . 
for 
which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or 
carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such 
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment 
for five years. . . ." In Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) the 
Supreme Court rejected the expansive reading of the verb "uses" 
advanced by the government -- a reading so broad that it would have 
left "carries" without any independent scope. Said Justice O'Connor, 
speaking for a unanimous Court: "While a broad reading of `use' 
undermines virtually any function for `carry,' a more limited, active 
interpretation of `use' preserves a meaningful role for `carries' as an 
alternative basis for a charge. Under the interpretation we enunciate 
today, a firearm can be used without being carried, e.g., when an 
offender has a gun on display during a transaction, or barters with a 
firearm without handling it; and a firearm can be carried without being 
used, e.g., when an offender keeps a gun hidden in his clothing 
throughout a drug transaction." Id. at 146. 
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Construction (1992 ed.) S 47.17.4 The ejusdem generis rule 
of construction has no application to U.S.S.G. 
S 2B3.1(b)(2)(C), since the three words in the guideline 
sequence -- "brandished, displayed, or possessed" -- are all 
specific; that is to say, there is no general word to be 
assigned content by reference to preceding specific words. 
 
Weadon is not the first person to argue that, in order to 
make sense out of S 2B3.1(b)(2)(C), one must read 
"possessed" as having a narrowed connotation drawn from 
its neighbors -- "brandished" and "displayed." In United 
States v. Johnson, 37 F.3d 1352 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 1175 (1995), appellant Johnson, 
challenging sentence, made essentially the same argument 
-- and did so, apparently, without nailing the argument to 
the procrustean bed of ejusdem generis. Johnson was a 
bank robber. "Upon Johnson's arrest, police discovered an 
unloaded firearm concealed in his pants. Johnson admitted 
he carried the weapon in his pants during the robbery, but 
he never showed it to anyone inside the bank, nor did he 
inform the bank teller he had a gun." Id. at 1353. Johnson 
"argue[d] the 5-level enhancement for possession of a 
weapon pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) was 
inappropriate because the gun was concealed during the 
robbery and no victim was aware of its presence." Id. The 
Ninth Circuit rejected the argument: 
 
        U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) provides a 5-level 
       enhancement "if a firearm was brandished, displayed, 
       or possessed" during a robbery. The guidelines define 
       "brandished" as "pointed or waved about, or displayed 
       n a threatening manner." U.S.S.G. S 1B1.1, comment. 
       (n.1(c)). The guidelines do not further define "displayed" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As the Court stated in Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19 
(1946) (construing the Mann Act phrase "for the purpose of prostitution 
or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose"), "[u]nder the ejusdem 
generis rule of construction the general words are confined to the class 
and may not be used to enlarge it;" compare the dissenting opinion of 
Justice Murphy, id. at 24-25, and the concurring opinion of Justice 
Rutledge, id. at 21; and see also the opinion of the Court in Caminetti v. 
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 487 (1917) and the dissenting opinion of 
Justice McKenna, id. at 497. Cf. United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 
869 n.15 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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       or "possessed." Johnson argues this court should 
       interpret "possessed" to mean "visibly possessed" or 
       possessed in such a way that the robbery victim is 
       aware of, and thus threatened by, the weapon's 
       presence. 
 
        To support his assertion, Johnson cites United States 
       v. Powell, 6 F.3d 611 (9th Cir. 1993). Powell held that 
       courts should avoid interpretations that render some 
       portions of the guidelines superfluous or do not give 
       effect to all terms used. Powell, 6 F.3d at 614. Johnson 
       asserts the district court's interpretation of "possessed" 
       eliminates the need for "brandished" and "displayed." 
       Johnson argues the three terms refer to different levels 
       of visible firearm possession, ranging from pointing the 
       weapon at victims to simple "open possession not 
       amounting to an ostentatious showing." 
 
        The Powell holding does not invalidate Johnson's 
       sentence enhancement. Johnson is correct that if the 
       enhancement applies any time a defendant possesses a 
       firearm during a robbery, it appears irrelevant whether 
       the firearm is brandished or displayed. However, this is 
       also true if we interpret "possessed" to mean "visibly 
       possessed." Even if we were to accept Johnson's 
       contention that a weapon is "possessed" only when it is 
       visible, the other terms of the guidelines would still 
       appear superfluous. 
 
       * * * 
 
        The plain meaning of the word "possessed" also 
       favors upholding Johnson's sentence. "Possess" is 
       defined as "to have in one's actual and physical 
       control; to have the exclusive detention and control of." 
       Black's Law Dictionary 1046 (5th ed. 1979). We are 
       aware of no definition of "possess" that requires an 
       object to be visible in order to be possessed. 
 
Id. at 1353-54. We agree with the Ninth Circuit.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Weadon also seeks to draw comfort from United States v. Dixon, 982 
F. 2d 116 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 921 (1993). In Dixon, 
this 
court affirmed enhancement of a bank robber's sentence pursuant to 
former S 2B3.1(b)(2)(C)(three-level enhancement "if a dangerous weapon 
 




For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 
court is affirmed. 
 
(Text continued on page 12) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
was brandished, displayed, or possessed") where the robber's accomplice 
had a towel over her hand in a manner perceived by bank employees as 
signifying that under the towel she held a gun. Enhancement was found 
proper based on a Commentary application note stating that "[w]here an 
object that appeared to be a dangerous weapon was brandished, 
displayed, or possessed, treat the object as a dangerous weapon." We 
held that the accomplice's covered hand was an "object" and that "[t]he 
object that was her hand, together with the object covering it, the towel, 
appeared to [the bank employees] to be a weapon." 982 F.2d at 122. In 
contrast, so Weadon contends, "in a case such as this where the victims 
were unaware of Mr. Weadon's firearm and were thus unaffected by it, 
an enhancement based upon the presence of the firearm would in fact 
contravene Dixon." Weadon's contention overlooks the fact that in Dixon 
-- which dealt with a "dangerous weapon" (not a "firearm") -- what was 
crucial was the Sentencing Commission's recital that"an object that 
appeared to be a dangerous weapon" should be treated as one, thus 
authorizing enhancement where no actual dangerous weapon was 
"brandished, displayed, or possessed." In the case at bar, Weadon 
"possessed" an actual firearm while engaged in three of his four 
robberies. 
 
The view that the Ninth Circuit reached the proper result in Johnson 
does not signify that the wording of S 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) is a model of the 
guideline-drafter's art. The word "possessed" appears to swallow up 
"brandished" and, in almost all instances,"displayed" as well. [The rare 
instance in which a "displayed" gun might, arguably, be said not to be 
"possessed" is exemplified by an illustration proffered by the Supreme 
Court in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995): "a firearm 
can be used without being carried, e.g., when an offender has a gun on 
display during a transaction;" but even this is likely to be deemed 
constructive possession]. How did this verbal anomaly come about? Again 
it may be helpful to consider the genesis of the guideline. 
 
As we have already noted, the weapons portion of the January 1987 
revised draft -- S B231(a)(1) -- was phrased in the following simple 
terms: "If a weapon or dangerous instrumentality was used, displayed, or 
possessed in the commission of the offense, increase by 3 to 6 levels, 
depending upon the use made of the weapon." A purist might have 
pointed out that the sentence was not syntactically optimal, since "use," 
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in the phrase "the use made of the weapon," evidently was intended to 
comprehend not only "used" but "displayed" and "possessed" as well; 
nonetheless, the sentence conveyed with reasonable clarity a range of 
weapon-related conduct in which possession -- mere possession -- 
called for the least enhancement, display called for intermediate 
enhancement, and use of some more elaborate and dangerous kind 
called for maximum enhancement. As we have seen, theS B231(a)(1) 
formulation was not followed in S 2B3.1(b)(2) as the latter was drafted 
and went into effect in the fall of 1987: "(A) If a firearm was 
discharged, 
increase by 5 levels; (B) if a firearm or a dangerous weapon was 
otherwise used, increase by 4 levels; (C) if a firearm or other dangerous 
weapon was brandished, displayed or possessed, increase by 3 levels." 
The transition from draft language to operative language had the 
undoubted benefit of singling out the discharge of a firearm as 
warranting a more severe response at sentencing than any other 
category of weapons use. But the same transition had the untoward 
result of bracketing the brandishing, display and possession of weapons 
in a single category with identical enhancement consequences -- an 
awkward result syntactically if not penologically. That bracketing has 
persisted to this day, notwithstanding that the guideline has been 
amended more than once. 
 
With respect to the Sentencing Commission's abiding concern for the 
potentially malign consequences of "possession" of a firearm, particular 
note should be taken of the amendment of S 2B3.1(b)(2) which took effect 
on November 1, 1991. Prior to that date S 2B3.1(b)(2) read as follows: 
 
       (A) If a firearm was discharged, increase by 5  levels; (B) if a 
       dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was otherwise used, 
       increase by 4 levels; (C) if a dangerous weapon (including a 
firearm) 
       was brandished, displayed, or possessed, increase by 3 levels; (D) 
if 
       an express threat of death was made, increase by 2 levels. 
 
As amended, S 2B3.1(b)(2) achieved its present form: 
 
       (A) If a firearm was discharged, increase by 7  levels; (B) if a 
firearm 
       was otherwise used, increase by 6 levels; (C) if a firearm was 
       brandished, displayed, or possessed, increase by 5 levels; (D) if a 
       dangerous weapon was otherwise used, increase by 4 levels; (E) if a 
       dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed, or possessed, 
       increase by 3 levels; or (F) if a threat of death was made, 
increase 
       by 2 levels. 
 
In explaining this substantial reconstruction of the guideline, the 
Sentencing Commission stated: "This amendment increases the offense 
levels for use or possession of a firearm by 2 levels to better reflect 
the 
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seriousness of such offenses and to reduce the disparity resulting from 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the charging of an offense 
under 18 U.S.C. S 924(c) [mandatory minimum sentence for crime of 
using or carrying a firearm during or in relation to a crime of violence 
or 
drug trafficking] or S 929(a) [mandatory minimum sentence for crime of 
using or carrying a firearm and possessing armor piercing ammunition 
during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking]." 
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